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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE EXTENSION OF NEGOTIABILITY TO DOCUMENTS
REPRESENTING GOODS*
JOSEPH P. MCKEEHAN**

There are two acts enacted by our 1937 Legislature for which I must assume
the blame or credit, according as you may. approve or disapprove of their provisions. The first is Act No. 134, enacted April 29th and found on page 550 of
the Pamphlet Laws, and the other is Act No. 278, enacted May 28th and found on
page 1009 of the Pamphlet Laws. The former amends sections 40 and 47 of our
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the other amends sections 32 and 38 of
our Uniform Sales Act. The amendments contained in these two acts are intended
to confer full negotiability upon documents of title to goods. The Uniform Sales
Act expressly excludes money and choses in action from the operation of those
provisions of the act relating to documents of title. Of course, the fourth section
of the act, the statute of frauds, expressly includes choses in action.
A document of title is most commonly illustrated by a bill of lading or
warehouse receipt, but it includes any other document used in the ordinary course
of business in the sale or transfer of goods as proof of possession or control of the
goods or authorizing, or purporting to authorize, the possessor of the document
to transfer or receive, either by endorsement or by delivery, the goods represented
by the document.
As long ago as 1866 our Legislature undertook to make warehouse receipts
and bills of lading negotiable and provided that they might be transferred by
endorsement and delivery and that such transfer should pass the title to the goods
mentioned in the bill or receipt. This act gave assurance to those who took these
documents as security that the goods represented thereby could not be lawfully
surrendered by the bailee, except upon the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding document. The act provided that non-negotiable bills could be issued,
if the words "not negotiable" were plainly stamped on the face of the document.
This act contained only seven sections, and its effect was greatly limited by
an important decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
*Being a paper read before the First Blair County Legal Institute conducted by the Blair
County Legal Guild in collaboration with members of the faculty of the Dickinson School of Law,
Carlisle, Pa.
**Joseph P. McKeehan, A.B., Dickinson College, 1897; A.M., Dickinson College, 1902;
J.L.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1902. Professor in Dickinson School of Law, 1902-. Member
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I refer to the case of Shaw v. Railway Company, 101 U. S. 557, decided in
1879. The case involved the conversion of a bill of lading by bankers to whom
it had been sent in connection with a draft drawn upon them. The converted bill
of lading was presented to the carrier, and the cotton it represented was sold.
The purchasers of the cotton contended that they took a good title, on the ground
that the bill of lading had, by statute, been made negotiable and that they were
purchasers for value in due course. Justice Strong, speaking for the court, consid'ered at length the meaning to be given to the statutory declaration that bills of
lading should be negotiable. He first declared that the word "negotiable" primarily expresses the idea that the effect of a transfer is to give the transferee a
right to enforce the promises contained in tne document by a suit in his own
name, a right which did not exist at common law and which arose from the
custom of merchants and bankers in connection with bills and notes.
He called attention to the fact that the endorser of a bill or note usually
becomes a guarantor and that a holder in due course may enforce the instrument
free from most defenses which would have been good between the original
parties, and to the further fact that a bill or note in form to be negotiated by
delivery can be sold and a good title given to a bona fide purchaser for value, even
though it be purchased from a thief or a finder, which, of course, is just the
reverse of the ordinary rule respecting personal property.
He pointed out, however, that negotiability may exist, if the single requirement that a transferee may sue in his own name exists, and that the incidents of
the cutting off of defenses and the acquisition of a better title than that held by
the transferor were, in no sense, necessary elements of negotiability, as these
incidents do not exist in the case of overdue bills and notes, though they continue
to be negotiable after maturity. He came to the conclusion that instruments calling for the payment of money should be treated as essentially different in character
from instruments calling for the delivery of goods. He conceded that a document
of title is a symbol of ownership of the goods mentioned in it, that is to say, a
representative of such goods, but he thought that, if a bona fide purchaser for
value of the goods themselves from a thief or a finder would get no title, that he
should get no better title merely because he purchased a document representing
the goods. He recognized that an entrusting of such a document to one who
proved faithless to the trust might operate to estop the owner from asserting his
title as against a bona fide purchaser from the one so entrusted, but he came to
the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to place documents of title on
the same footing as bills and notes and that in the absence of circumstances adequate to create an estoppel, the purchaser of a converted bill acquired no title to
the goods represented thereby and that his only recourse would be against the
one from whom he purchased the document. He applied the rule of statutory
construction that a statute is not to be construed as altering the common law
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further than the necessary import of its words, and he thought the placing of bills
of lading on the same footing with bills of exchange would be such an extraordinary innovation that it should not be supposed to be intended without words
which could be given no other meaning. The policy of the law has always been
to protect the owner of personal property against its conversion by others.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM SALES ACT

In 1909 our Legislature enacted the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. In
1911 it enacted the Uniform .Bills of Lading Act, and in 1915 the Uniform Sales
Act. The Bills of Lading Act expressly empowered a thief or a finder to give a
good title to a bill of lading to a purchaser for value without notice. In this
respect, it went beyond the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, which only protected such a purchaser, if he bought from one to whom the owner had entrusted
the receipt. The Uniform Sales Act contains fourteen sections relating to documents of title, and since it defines this term as including both warehouse receipts
and bills of lading, the question arose as to whether, in drafting provisions applicable to both bills of lading and warehouse receipts, it should follow the
language of the Warehouse Receipts Act or the language of the Bills of Lading
Act. If it had followed the language of the Bills of Lading Act, it would have
involved an extension of the negotiability of warehouse receipts, but instead of
doing this, it reverted to the language of the Warehouse Receipts Act, and on its
face it retraced the advance made in the enactment of the Bills of Lading Act.
However, there is a joker in the Sales Act. Section 78 of this act provides
that it shall not be construed to repeal or eliminate any of the provisions of the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act, so that we have the provisions of an earlier
inconsistent act controlling the provisions of a later statute expressly covering the
same ground.
I happened to be teaching Sales when the Uniform Sales Act was enacted,
and in November of that year I contributed to the Dickinson Law Review an
article which criticized at length the want of uniformity in the provisions of the
various acts extending negotiability to documents other than bills and notes. I
included in my discussion the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which extends full
negotiability to stock certificates and which was enacted in the same year in which
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act was enacted, (see Act of 1911, P. L. 126).
There were many other sections of these acts involving the same legal questions
which not only differed in manner of expression but which were different in
substance. My article attracted the attention of the President of the American Bar
Association. He forwarded it to Professor Samuel Williston, who had been employed by the Commissioners on Uniform Sales Laws to draft all of the acts
which I criticized. Professor Williston wrote me a letter requesting an opportunity to make reply in the Dickinson Law Review, and, of course, he was urged
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to do so. His reply appears in the June, 1916, issue, which is Volume 20, page
263. With regard to the discrepancy between the acts with reference to the titl-,
acquired by purchase from a thief or finder, he stated:
"The opinion of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws undoubtedly underwent a change after the preparation of the Sales Act
and Warehouse Receipts Act, and before the promulgation of the
Bills of Lading Act and the Stock Certificates Act. Even the earlier
statutes go somewhat beyond the common law, as previously understood, in protecting a purchaser of a document. The later statutes
give the same negotiability to Bills of Lading as Bills of Exchange
possess. The difference between the statutes is doubtless undesirable, but if considered a serious matter is easily rectified by a brief
amendment to the Warehouse Receipts Act."
As long ago as 1918, the Legislature of Massachusetts amended the Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Sales Act to make them harmonize with the
provisions of the Bills of Lading Act, and I have always suspected that Professor
Williston deserved the credit for bringing these acts into harmony in his hom2
state. In 1922 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended thc
change. Thirteen states made the change shortly thereafter.
Ever since the explanation given by Professor Williston, I have attempted,
off and on, to secire a similar amendment from our own Legislature. Repeatedly
students of mine have become members of the Legislature, and they have asked
me to submit bills which would bring these acts into harmony. Until 1937, however, it has never been possible to secure action. In one session I was advised
that the bills would have been passed but for the opposition of a single member
who, at one time, had been a student in my class in Sales, but who could not be
convinced that the proposed bills were not revolutionary in character. It appeared
that he was the chairman of the committee to which the bills were referred in the
house. The amendments contained in the acts of 1937 were sponsored by Senator
Robert Lee Jacobs, a Carlisle lawyer who had recently graduated from our law
school. He explained to me that he had had considerable difficulty, as a student,
in keeping straight the law on the subject, and he thought he would be doing a
good turn for future students of the law school if he ironed out som-e of the
discrepancies in these acts. Wvihen the acts were finally enacted, he attended the
signing by the Governor, procured the pen with which they were signed and
delivered it to me as a souvenir.
Our own Supreme Court has been slow to recognize the full import of the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act. In Kendall Produce Co. v. Terminal Warehouse &
Transfer Co., 295 Pa. 450, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

"Under section 32 of the Bills of Lading Act of June 9, 1911, P. L.
838, a person to whom a negotiable document of title, such as a bill
of lading, has been duly negotiated, acquired thereby only such title
to the goods as the person negotiating the bill to him had, or had
ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value."
As a matter of fact the act expressly provides that such an one acquires not
merely the title which the one negotiating the bill may have had, but also whatever
title either the consignor or consignee of the goods may have had, and, if the
consignor or consignee had a voidable title, the purchaser acquires a good title.
It is only necessary that the shipper of the goods should have had at least a voidable title. If a thief or finder of goods consigns them to another, this defect of
title will inhere in the goods into whosesoever hands they may come, and they
may, of course, be reclaimed by the true owner, but, if the bill be a negotiable
one, there is no type of conversion of the document which will impair the title of
an innocent purchaser, either to the document or to the goods represented thereby.
If one in possession under a conditional sale contract, duly recorded, should consign the goods so held, taking a negotiable bill therefor, and should sell the bill
to one who had no actual notice of his conditional title, the buyer would have
constructive notice and would take no better title than if he had bought the goods
themselves. The same is, of course, true if the shipper is a mere bailee of the
own'er.
I took occasion to call attention to this misleading statement in an article in
Volume 36 of the Dickinson Law Review, at page 157, which is the issue of
January, 1932. In the case referred to, the consignor of the goods was a mere
bailee. who had no authority to ship the goods or to sell them, and, therefore, the
result reached was correct, but it is unfortunate that the case was not disposed of
on a correct ground, instead of on a ground which was in the teeth of the statutory
provision and which only raised the question as to whether the law is to be taken
from the statute or from the Supreme Court.
In Volume 77 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, at page 467,
there appears an article by Professor Ralph S. Bauer, in which the writer advocates a consolidation of the provisions of the uniform commercial statutes, with
a view to ironing out the discrepancies which they contain which have no greater
justification than the discrepancy to which I have been referring. In Volume 42
of the Dickinson Law Review, at page 38, you will find a brief comment on these
acts of 1937 which may be of interest.
OTHER INCIDENTS OF NEGOTIABLE

DOCUMENTS

Bailees, whether they be warehousemen or carriers, may still issue nonnegotiable documents but their negotiability is not to be determined by the marking of the document "non-negotiable," as under our old statute. If a bill of
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lading is an order bill, it is fully negotiable, even though it contains an express
provision that it is non-negotiable. (Section five of the act). In other words, all
order bills are negotiable bills and all straight bills a:e non-negotiable. In Marine
National Batik v. Baringer, 46 Pa. Super. 510, there is an inimitable charge to
the jury by Judge Sulzberger in which he rcfers to such a bill as a "flat" bill of
lading.
Straight or "flat" bills of lading may be transferred by the holder, and upon
notification to the carrier, the act curiously provides that the transferee thereby
acquires the "direct" obligation of the carrier as to all obligations which the
carrier owed to the transferor of the bill immediately before the notification; but
prior to such notification, the goods still continue to be subject to attachment or
to levy upon an execution as goods of the fransferor, and his right may also be
defeated by sale of the goods by the transferor to a subsequent innocent purchaser
who gives notice to the carrier before the carrier receives notice of the transfer of
the bill.
We now have the curious situation that the one inseparable incident of
negotiability, as Justice Strong conceived it to be in Shaw v. Railway Co., is now,
by statute, an incident of non-negotiable bills, whereas the incidents which he
thought were entirely incompatible with documents representing goods are now
clearly conferred on such documents by statute.
In Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. of Mount Carmel v. Tye, 129 Pa.
Super. 481. Judge Keller states that an assignee of a chose of action, even though
he has given the garnishee no notice of his assignment, has priority over a subsequent attaching creditor, citing Phillips' Estate, 205 Pa. 525. The case involves
the attachment of stock in a building and loan association, and it contains an
interesting discussion of the effect of the negotiability conferred upon certificates
of stock by the act of 1911, which, however, he holds is inapplicable to stock of
building and loan associations. Stock certificates which fall within the act of
1911 may not be attached unless the certificate is actually seized by the officer
making the attachment or it is surrendered to the corporation which issued it or
its transfer by the holder enjoined.
There is an interesting opinion in Mills vs. Jacobs, 131 Pa. Super. 469,
which has since been affirmed by our Supreme Court, which discusses the use of a
fi. fa. to levy upon certificates of stock, in what is known as street form, that is to
say, certificates which have bcen endorsed in blank. A distinction is taken between stock in corporations which are chartered in states whose statutes make
stock certificates negotiable and stock in corporations chartered in states in which
the stock can only be transferred on the books of the company, and it now appears
to be clear that, if the sheriff can actually levy upon and take possession of certificates of stock issued by a corporation chartered in a state which has enacted the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the sheriff may sell the same and give a good title.
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Of course, where the certificates are held as collateral by a bank, the sale is made
subject to the interest of the pledgee and the amount of the indebtedness to the
bank is first paid out of the proceeds of sale.
The provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Act as to the rights of a transferee of a non-negotiable receipt are out of line with the provisions of the Bills
of Lading Act in regard to the obligations of the bailee acquired by the transferee.
The Warehouse Receipts Act purports to give the transferee the same direct obligation of the warehouseman but defines these obligations as those expressed by
the terms of the receipt. This provision needs amendment, as there is no doubt
that the warehouseman might properly deliver a portion of the goods without
noting such delivery on a non-negotiable receipt. In the case of negotiable receipts, any such delivery must be noted on the document.
THE EFFECT OF NEGOTIABILITY UPON THE RIGHTS OF

A

SELLER OF GOODS AS AGAINST A BUYER-CONSIGNEE

A seller of goods who consigns to a buyer by a negotiable bill and parts with
the bill loses his right of stoppage in transit, if the bill gets into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser for value, even though the carrier has received a notice from
the seller to stop the goods before the time when the bill is negotiated. The act
also provides that, though one does not buy the bill of lading itself but merely
buys the goods, the history of which he knows nothing about, if the seller transmits the bill to the buyer, though he at the time accompanies it with a draft for
the price, so that the use of the bill without honoring the draft would constitute
a conversion, if the buyer utilizes the bill to get the goods, he may give a good
title to the goods to an innocent purchaser for value. This is an extension of the
estopp'el doctrine and appears to be good law, and is in no way dependent upon
the fact that the purchaser relied upon the negotiable character of a document he
purchased. All of these acts include pledgees in their definition of a purchaser
for value. The original parties to a contract of sale are always called seller 'and
buyer. A subsequent purchaser may be either a buyer, a mortgagee or a pledgee.
It is enough that he parts with value, and the acts all expressly provide that one
is deemed to have paid value, if there be any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract and that a preexisting obligation constitutes value when a document is taken either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor.
One difference between negotiable instruments and negotiable documents
which was stressed by Justice Strong in Shaw vs. Railway Co. still survives. The
endorsement of a document involves no guaranty that the terms of the contract
expressed therein will be performed on the part of the bailee or that prior endorsers of the document will fulfill the obligations they may have assumed. However, whill there is no such guaranty incident to the endorsement of a negotiable
document, the sale of any document, whether negotiable or not, or the assignment
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for value of a claim which is secured by a document, does involve a number of
warranties. Such a one warrants that the document is genuine; that he has a right
to transfer it; and that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair its
validity or worth. There may be further implied warranties which relate to the
goods themsclves, but these are to be determined by the circumstances, just as if
there had been no document involved in the transaction.
When a bank presents a draft for payment, which is secured by a bill and
the draft is honored and it then develops that the bill is worthless or even forged,
the authorities have been in conflict as to whether the bank receiving the proceeds
of the draft is to be deemed to have negotiated the bill and incurred liability on
the implied warranties imposed on those who negotiate or transfer documents.
The act provides that the bank is not deemed to warrant either the genuineness
of the bill or the quantity or quality of the goods described in the bill.
A negotiable bill may be transferred. The transfer does not rank as ,a
negotiation unless the bill is properly endorsed, but there is an implied undertaking to complete the transfer by endorsement. The negotiation, however, is
effective only from the time of actual endorsement. This suggests that during
the interval the rights of the transferee may be defeated by the intervening rights
of third persons.
In my article I suggested the desirability of giving a one hundred per cent
protection to innocent purchasers of negotiable documents. As long as one's
rights may be defeated by the fact that one negotiating the document may have
done so in disregard of an injunction, no such protection exists. Professor Williston replied that, while the acts do not make the document the sole representative
of the property therein described, he thought that as a practical matter negotiating
in disregard of an injunction would not often happen and that purchasers might
be permitted to still run this risk.
It may be noted that our Legislature deleted from section 47 of the Warehouse Receipts Act a phrase which also occurs in section 38 of the Uniform Sales'
Act. Prior to the 1937 amendments they both said that a good title would be
acquired if the person to whom the document was negotiated, or a peison to
whom the document was subsequently negotiated, paid value therefor, etc. These
acts were referred to separate committees, and apparently the committees had no
contact with each other. Someone on the committee in charge of the Warehouse
Receipts Act evidently conceived that, since each negotiation cures all prior defects in title to the document, it was quite apparent that, if several negotiations
had occurred, it was quite enough if there was a purchaser for value in good faith
involved in any one negotiation, so that the phrase mentioned was deleted from
the Warehouse Receipts Act but it still remains in the Uniform Sales Act. These
amendments are complimentary to each other, and unquestionably the two bills
should have been referred to the same committee. This incident shows that you
can never tell what may.come out of a legislature.
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The proposed new rules of procedure, Nos. 2001, 2002 and 2003, provide
that all actions by assignees or by persons entitled by virtue of subrogation shall
be brought in their own names, and the present practice of suing in the name of
A to the use of B will be abandoned, unless it is necessary to sue in this form
because of some statutory provision. The only such statute noted by the committee
is the act of 1878 relating to the assumption of encumbrances by purchasers of
real estate.
Under the old act of 1715, the assignee of instruments, payable to A or his
assigns, was authorized to sue in his own name. But it has always been held that
this did not affect the right of the debtor to set'up any defense which he would
have had, had there been no assignment. The new rules expressly provide that
this shall continue to be true, unless such defenses are cut off because of the
negotiable character of the instrument. Since the decision of Justice Gibson in
Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Pa. 136, it has been settled that, in an action by A to the
use of B, it is "to lard the declaration with impertinence" for one to trace the
derivation of his right from the assignor to the assignee, and those claiming to
be prior assignees, and desiring to contest the right of the use plaintiff, have
always been required to lie low and intervene only after the recovery of judgment.
Under the new rules, in order to make out his case, the plaintiff will have to trace
in his statement of claim the derivation of his cause of action from the one to
whom the cause of action originally accrued, and it will be interesting to see what
the courts will have to say as to the method to be used to resolve conflicting claims
of assignees from the same assignor.
Furthermore, under the new rules, since the use plaintiff is now to become
the only plaintiff, he will have to have legal capacity to sue, and all of the new
rules relative to actions by minors will become applicable. The rules provide that
when an assignment occurs after action is brought, it shall be optional as to
whether the assignee shall b'e substituted for the original plaintiff. However, the
defendant in the action may petition the court and the court may order substitution, if it appears that there may be defenses which would be good against the
assignee but which would not be good against the assignor. If the new rules are
approved by the Supreme Court, the law in Pennsylvania will have swung to the
other extreme, as compared with the rules laid down in Shaw vs. Railway Co.
The one outstanding and inseparable incident of negotiability, as it was then
viewed, was the right of a transftree to sue in his own name. This right is now
to he made general and the incidents of negotiability, which were supposed to be
incompatible in documents involving goods rather than money, have likewise
been extended to all such documents. This is an interesting illustration of the
growth of the law, and how the ideas of one generation may be just the reverse of
the ideas of its predecessors.
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